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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 930114-CA 
v. : 
JOSEPH C. VALDEZ, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of tampering with 
evidence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-510 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is: 
1. Was thereKsufficient evidence to prove that 
defendant, aware that an investigation was in progress or that an 
official proceeding was imminent, intentionally removed an 
intoxilyzer test record and checklist from a booking room with 
the purpose of impairing the investigation or the proceeding? 
When challenging the jury's verdict, the defendant must show that 
the evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983). " [S]o long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences support the jury's findings, [the appellate court] 
will not disturb them. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985)." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 
1990) . To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so 
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his 
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. Id. at 738-39. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are attached at Addendum A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Joseph C. Valdez, was charged by information 
with tampering with evidence, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1990) (Count I), driving 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 
1992) (Count II), driving a motor vehicle while license was 
suspended or revoked, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-136 (Supp. 1992) (Count III), open container of 
alcohol in a motor vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (Supp. 1992) (Count IV), and use 
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of a license plate registered to another vehicle, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305 (Supp. 
1992) (Count V) (R. 02-03) . Count III was dismissed at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 11-A). 
A jury found defendant guilty on Counts I, II, IV and V 
(R. 83, 85, 87, 89). At sentencing the second degree felony for 
tampering with evidence (Count I) was reduced to a third degree 
felony, and defendant was sentenced to a term of zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison on that count (R. 95-96). 
Defendant was sentenced to terms of six months on Count II and 
ninety days on both Counts IV and V (R. 96). All terms were 
ordered to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively 
to any other sentences defendant was then serving in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 96). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 16, 1992, Utah Highway Patrolman Paul Brown 
arrested defendant for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol (hereinafter "DUI") following defendant's substandard 
performance on field sobriety tests and booked him into the 
Summit County Jail (T. 2, 15-23, 27). Obtaining defendant's 
consent to an intoxilyzer test, Patrolman Brown generated an 
intoxilyzer checklist (State's Ex. 1) and a test record (State's 
Ex. 2), which showed, respectively, the test to have been 
administered in accordance with established procedures and 
defendant's blood alcohol content to be .185 grams of alcohol, 
more than twice the legal limit (T. 28-38, 64; State's Ex. 2). 
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After informing defendant of the results of the test, 
Patrolman Brown placed the checklist and test record on the 
booking table, between defendant and him (T. 37-38). A few feet 
away, seated on the same side of the booking table, Edwin Thacker 
of the Summit County Sheriff's Office, then on jail duty, took 
identification information and logged defendant into the computer 
(T. 71-76). Defendant then asked permission to use the restroom, 
and Officer Thacker accompanied him to the drunk tank where 
defendant used the toilet (T. 39, 74-75). Defendant and Officer 
Thacker returned to the booking area, but seven minutes later, as 
Officer Brown continued processing the DUI report form and 
Officer Thacker continued at the computer on the intake process, 
defendant again asked to use the restroom (T. 40, 75-77). 
Officer Thacker again accompanied defendant to the 
drunk tank (T. 77). Standing about seven feet from defendant, 
Officer Thacker saw defendant stand directly in front of the 
toilet with his back to him and engage him in conversation while 
looking over his left shoulder: 
I observed, while he was looking over 
his shoulder,^his hand was in the position as 
if he was using the toilet. But then I saw 
something fall between his legs into the 
toilet. Some object. At that time, I then 
went toward him. He noticed that I had 
started toward him. He pushed the flush 
button, which is located on the right side 
and stepped away from the toilet. And I made 
a dash for the toilet and grabbed the objects 
that were in the water. 
(T. 78). 
The objects retrieved, which had been wadded into a 
4 
ball, were the checklist and the test record (T. 41-42, 79). 
Officer Brown confronted defendant about his destruction of 
evidence in the drunk tank and recorded their exchange, in which 
defendant stated that he had not been aware of what the "papers" 
were or that they were important because they had been given to 
him and he intended to plead guilty anyway (T. 48; State's Ex. 5, 
R. 22-27) . 
Defendant testified that he had been convicted of DUI 
on three previous occasions and that in each case he had been 
given the results of his intoxilyzer tests (T. 95). In the 
booking room Officer Thacker gave him cards containing bail 
information, which were placed in front of him, as though in his 
own little section (T. 93-94). The "papers," referring to 
exhibits 1 and 2, were set in front of him by the cards that 
Officer Thacker had given him, and defendant figured they were 
his (T. 107-08). Defendant testified that he intended to plead 
guilty to DUI as soon as he was pulled over. He assumed the 
papers were a receipt for the intoxilyzer, which he threw in the 
toilet because they were unimportant to him, not because he 
intended to "inhibit the DUI charge at all" (T. 96-97). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably have inferred that defendant intentionally removed an 
intoxilyzer checklist and test record from the Summit County 
booking room, knowing that an official proceeding related to his 
arrest for DUI was imminent and that such evidence would have to 
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be available in such a proceeding. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, defendant surreptitiously removed the evidence 
from the area in which he was being booked and attempted to flush 
it down the toilet. Thereafter he made up excuses that he had 
intended to plead guilty anyway and that he thought the checklist 
and test record were merely receipts which he was free to dispose 
of. Defendant's excuses are undermined l?y the testimony of two 
police officers present at the scene, and most particularly by 
defendant's asking to use the toilet only minutes after having 
first used it. 
Such evidence and its inferences are not so 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). Further, because defendant has failed to 
marshal all the evidence from which the jury might reasonably 
have inferred that defendant acted with culpable intent, this 
Court should decline to consider defendant's appeal on its 
merits. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH TO 
INFER THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY DISPOSED 
OF THE CHECKLIST AND TEST RECORD. 
On appeal defendant claims that he lacked culpable 
intent for tampering with evidence because, when he attempted to 
flush the checklist and test record down the toilet, he did not 
6 
believe that they had any significance. In support, defendant 
apparently argues that (1) he did not contemplate any official 
proceeding because he intended to plead guilty to DUI in any 
event, and (2) since these papers had apparently been given to 
him, he reasonably assumed they were not evidence to be made 
available in any investigation or proceeding. 
In order to successfully challenge the jury's verdict 
the reviewing court must find that the evidence and its 
inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). In undertaking 
such review, the appellate court will "view the evidence, along 
with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738 
(Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). "tS]o long as some evidence 
and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the 
court] will not disturb them. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 
345 (Utah 1985)." Ibid. 
To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient. Failure to so marshal the evidence 
waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency 
considered on appeal. Moore, 802 P.2d at 738-39. 
In this case there was sufficient evidence, which 
7 
defendant has failed to marshal, from which the jury could 
reasonably have inferred that defendant acted with culpable 
intent in attempting to flush the checklist and test record down 
the toilet. 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-510 (1990) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
A person commits a felony of the second 
degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or 
removes anything with a purpose to impair its 
verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation[.] 
1. Defendant's Belief Concerning 
Pending and Imminent Investigations 
and Official Proceedings. 
Upon arriving at the jail Officer Brown established 
that defendant understood that he had been arrested on DUI (T. 
28). At the conclusion of the intoxilyzer test defendant was 
aware that his blood alcohol content was more than double the 
legal limit and that the results of the test had been printed out 
on the test record (T. 37-38, 64, 91). Upon these facts it was 
clear that not only was?, defendant already involved in an 
investigation, but that a prosecution for DUI was about to be 
instituted. Furthermore, and notwithstanding defendant's 
protestations that he did not believe that prosecution was 
imminent because of his alleged intent to plead guilty to DUI, 
Officer Brown testified that the checklist and test record would 
have to be offered in evidence at an administrative hearing 
before the Driver's License Division to establish whether (1) 
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there had been probable cause for an arrest and (2) there were 
grounds for suspending defendant's license (T. 66). Defendant 
would have known these hearings would take place even if he 
pleaded guilty, a fact the jury could reasonably have inferred 
from defendant's three prior DUI arrests. Thus, the evidence was 
sufficient to establish that defendant knew that, regardless of 
whether or not he pleaded guilty, an official proceeding was 
about to be instituted, apart from the very investigation then 
on-going. 
2. Defendant's Intent to Make 
Evidence Unavailable. 
Defendant evidently argues that he believed the papers 
which subsequently turned out to be the checklist and test record 
had effectively been given to him and, thus, were not in his mind 
evidence which would have to have been available in any 
investigation or proceeding. However, there was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could have inferred that defendant 
was perfectly aware that the papers placed near him were not his, 
but rather significant evidence necessary to prove DUI. 
Immediately after the toilet flushing incident, both 
Officers Brown and Thacker confronted defendant, stating that any 
papers that had been given to him were taken right back (R. 25-
26). At trial Officer Brown testified that since the time the 
intoxilyzer test had become part of the regular DUI investigation 
procedure he had not given test results to defendants (R. 51). 
Even if defendant believed that the checklist and test record had 
been placed in his "little section," the jury could reasonably 
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have doubted that he considered them his. The test record is a 
triplicate form composed of a two thin sheets backed by a thicker 
third sheet (T. 50; State's Ex. 2). The top sheet bore the 
original imprint of the intoxilyzer, indicating the results of 
the test, along with Officer Brown's original handwriting. 
Officer Brown had not torn out any of the sheets (R. 50). He 
also confirmed that it would be more difficult to convict a 
defendant without being able to produce the intoxilyzer test 
record (R. 70). Thus, defendant would have had the jury believe 
that the State was surrendering to him all of its documentary 
evidence attesting to his level of intoxication, significant 
evidence in either a trial or administrative proceeding, a 
defense made all the more improbable considering defendant's 
prior experience with three DUI proceedings. 
Defendant also argues that he considered the papers 
unimportant because he already had made up his mind to plead 
guilty to DUI. Defendant's prior experience with DUI 
proceedings, which presumably also consisted of appearances 
before the Driver's License Division, undermines this claim, as 
argued above. However, the jury could reasonably have inferred 
that this claim was specious on the facts of the instant 
investigation. 
When confronted by Officer Brown after the toilet 
flushing incident, defendant claimed that he had already informed 
the officer of his intention to plead guilty when he told the 
officer he had been drinking when first pulled over (R. 24-25). 
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Officer Brown immediately retorted that defendant's 
acknowledgment that he had been drinking was not a statement of 
defendant's intention to plead guilty and that defendant could 
still plead not guilty (R. 24-25), an outcome borne out by 
subsequent events. At trial Officer Brown testified that when he 
spoke to defei;dant after he had been pulled over, defendant said 
that he had a few beers and that he had been fishing. It was 
only after the toilet flushing incident that defendant told him 
that he was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (T. 
46) . 
In sum, the evidence could reasonably have supported an 
inference that defendant's claim about pleading guilty was merely 
a sham alibi hastily trotted out to cover his attempt to dispose 
of the test record and checklist. Indeed, Officer Brown stated 
that following the incident defendant was no longer cooperative, 
started playing "mind games," and kept asking to make a deal (T. 
60; R. 23). 
The most corroborating evidence was defendant's sudden 
need to again relieve himself, followed by his suspicious 
disposal of the evidence. When stopped, defendant's van 
contained sixteen empty beer cans (T. 25). There was clear 
evidence that defendant had a strong urge to urinate when finally 
allowed to use the restroom (T. 92). Both Officer Thacker and 
defendant testified that defendant used the toilet the first time 
he went to the restroom (T. 75, 105). A mere seven minutes after 
having relieved himself defendant again asked to use the restroom 
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(T. 40, 76). Officer Thacker did not recall seeing anything in 
defendant's hands on the way to the restroom (T. 86). There was 
no testimony that defendant actually used the toilet. Rather, 
defendant held his hand as if using the toilet. As defendant 
engaged Officer Thacker in conversation, while watching the 
policeman over his shoulder, the wadded evidence fell into the 
toilet. When defendant noticed Officer Thacker starting toward 
him, he flushed the toilet (T. 78). From this evidence, 
characterized as it was by the State's witness, the jury could 
reasonably have inferred that defendant was deliberately 
attempting to dispose of evidence he believed was being used in 
the present investigation or an official proceeding yet to be 
instituted. 
Defendant argues that this Court should find the 
evidence in this case insufficient, as it did in State v. Harman, 
767 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1989). In Harman, this Court reversed a 
jury conviction because the evidence demonstrated that, while the 
defendant disapproved of a certain report, he had nonetheless 
sent copies of it to other responsible officials. Thus, this 
Court stated that the "evidence of guilt was so slight, so 
conflicting, and so inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
could not have concluded that [defendant tampered with the 
evidence], rather than rejecting it because it was a 'bad 
report.'" IcL at 569. 
The defense in this case relied exclusively on 
defendant's testimony. "The jury is not obliged to believe a 
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defendant's evidence where there is sufficient evidence of guilt 
presented." State v. Eaton. 701 P.2d 496 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam) (holding the defendant's startled response to discovery 
of his wrongful manipulation of an intoxilyzer which produced 
results which he then tried to void sufficient evidence of 
tampering). In contradistinction to both defendant's evidence in 
this case and the quantum of evidence presented in Harman, the 
State showed that defendant removed evidence from the booking 
table and intentionally tried to dispose of it in a surreptitious 
manner. 
In sum, fl[a]ny argument that fair minded jurors could 
not reasonably believe that the defendant 'concealed or removed' 
that evidence does not seem to harmonize with ordinary experience 
and common sense." State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977). 
Further, because defendant has failed to marshal all the evidence 
from which the jury might reasonably have inferred that defendant 
acted with culpable intent, this Court should decline to consider 
defendant's appeal on its merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7 day of August, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
' KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Utah Code Ann. (1990) 
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence* 
A person commits a felony of the second 
degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or 
removes anything with a purpose to impair its 
verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
